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Abstract—Online social search (OSS) brings forth a new way
to harness the Internet for answers. In this paper, we study the
balancing between OSS users’ capabilities and responsibilities.
Targeting a practical system design, we propose an analytical
model that captures the heterogeneity of different referral ses-
sions in OSS, and a distributed socio-aware referral strategy that
can achieve the desired balance when the system reaches steady
state. We show that configuring the strategy enables the system
operator to control the flow of all posed questions in the system.
We also discuss the implications of configuring the strategy from
a gaming-strategy point of view.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social search (OSS) brings forth a new way to
harness the Internet for answers, utilizing the underlying
network structure of online social networks (OSN) to find
information [1] [2] via friends, and friends’ friends. In a
typical OSS system, each user registers his expertise in his
profile. A person looking for experts sends the question to his
selected contacts. When a user receives a question on which
he is an expert, he responds to the questioner. Independently,
he can also forward it to his selected contacts. In this way,
the question is passed on in the social network. Finally, the
questioner may be presented with a great number of potential
respondents.
In this paper, we study the balancing between users’ ca-
pabilities and undertaken responsibilities. Capability refers to
expertise, that is, the amount of expertise a user supplies
to the OSS system, and responsibility measures the number
of questions a node receives. Conceivably, a person may be
unwilling to bother himself to answer others’ questions on
which he is expert though, sometimes, he also uses OSS to find
experts on his own questions, thus straining the participating
willingness of other OSN users. As opposed to this, our design
relies on the principle that more knowledgable (or active) OSN
users can provide more help to the online society, that is, the
higher the capability, the higher the responsibility.
Targeting a practical system design, we first propose an
analytical model that captures the heterogeneity of different
referral sessions, relating the question forwarding probability
at each node in a referral chain to the expertise of the node
who poses this question. This reflects the social connections
between the questioner and his reference nodes. Here, we
consider a referral session as the process from when a question
∗ This research is supported in part by the University of Hong Kong
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is injected to the system until it is discarded by an intermediate
user in the referral chain or until it exceeds a customized hop-
limit. Since in practice an OSN user maintains its local social
network, we equip the nodes in our model with the intelligence
of awareness, assuming every node is aware of the expertise
of its neighbors. We propose a socio-aware referral strategy
(SARS), which draws on the classic Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm [3]. We prove that our proposed referral strategy
can achieve a desired balance between nodes’ capabilities and
responsibilities when the system reaches the steady state. We
analyze in detail the strategy’s configuration functions which
are accessible to the system operator, enabling the system
to control the flow of all posed questions in the system. In
particular, the system can assign responsibilities to nodes in
any positive relationship with nodes’ expertise during a time
period of interest, such as proportional, or square proportional.
We also evaluate our proposed referral strategy based on the
crawled data of a set of real OSNs with various settings,
and find that SARS outperforms the traditional random walk
strategy.
A salient contribution in this study is that, based on the
concept of balance, we substantiate the net benefit of an OSS
user by a payoff function, and analyze it from a gaming-
strategy point of view. With two concrete examples, we con-
tend that, with the desired balance, inappropriate configuration
of the referral strategy may lead to ramifications to the OSS
applications.
In contents to follow, we first present our analytical model in
Section II, followed by the proposed referral strategy and the
analyses in Section III, in which we also give a brief review
of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm we draw on. Then we
evaluate the system by simulations in Section IV, and finally,
we conclude our study with suggestions for future work in
Section V.
II. MODEL
We consider an OSN as an undirected graph G(V, E), where
V is the set of nodes (OSN users) and E ⊆ V ×V is the set of
edges (social ties) in the network. Each edge means one-hop
question-forwarding is possible between the corresponding
pair of nodes. Let n = |V| be the number of users in the
system. We also denote by Nu ⊆ V the set of neighbors of
Node u, and du = |Nu| the number of users in this set.
In the system, each user supplies the information of his
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expertise1 in his profile. We denote by wu the expertise of
Node u and, in practice, wu can be published through being
embedded in the questions posed by Node u. When a user
poses a question to the underlying social network, he hopes
that answers could appear from his friends, his friends’ friends,
and so forth. However, in reality, a user may not be willing to
help others forward a question even if he can not respond to the
questioner (e.g. not an expert or not interested in answering)
since it will cost his effort. For generality, in our model we
assume that a node receiving a question will forward it to the
next reference with probability q, i.e., discarding the question
with probability 1−q, where q is independent of its expertise.
We study the practical case in which q is heterogeneous in
different referral sessions, and relate q to Node u who initiates
the current referral session, denoting it by qu.
Definition 1. The forwarding probability qu is an increasing
function of the expertise of Node u, i.e., ∂qu∂wu > 0.
The above definition captures the social connections between
the questioner and his reference nodes in a referral session.
The scenario for this is that people will likely be more willing
to help a person who could potentially be more helpful to them
(i.e. more knowledgeable). In addition, we allow a questioner
to receive multiple answers in a referral session. Obviously, the
number of returned answers is closely related to the number of
references a question is forwarded to, which is determined by
the forwarding probability q. A higher q indicates a higher
visibility of the question, which is more beneficial to the
questioner. Thus the above definition says a node with lower w
is less able to approach multiple experts on its question. This
discourages nodes from publishing underestimated expertise
in the system.
Definition 2. The responsibility Node u takes, denoted by
ru, is defined as the number of questions Node u receives
during the time period of interest.
The responsibility directly represents the workload a node
undertakes. We hope that a more knowledgable node can make
more contributions to the online society by answering more
questions from others, i.e., in our context, receiving more
questions.
We consider a practical system design that imposes a limit
T on the number of hops a question can be forwarded. At each
hop of a referral session, the node forwards the question with
probability q to a randomly selected neighboring reference. We
can obtain S, the expected number of references a question is
directed to,
S =
T−1∑
j=1
j · qj−1(1− q) + T · qT−1
=
1− qT−1
1− q + q
T−1.
We assume n is large, and denote by ei the expert den-
sity [4], that is, the probability that a node is an expert on
1In this paper, a user’s expertise is measured in terms of the number of
topics on which he is expert.
Question i. Thus the expected number of answers obtained by
the questioner posing Question i is
Ai = ei · S
= ei · [ 1− q
T−1
1− q + q
T−1] (1)
Thus, the benefit of registering more expertise can be observed
quantitatively, by verifying
∂Ai
∂wu
=
∂Ai
∂qu
· ∂qu
∂wu
> 0.
From the viewpoint of a system operator, it is rational to
have a node with higher expertise undertake higher responsi-
bility, such that all nodes contribute to the online society in a
balanced manner. In the following, we propose a distributed
referral strategy that can match the responsibility to the
expertise.
III. MATCHING RESPONSIBILITY TO CAPACITY
Based on the above model, we study how to achieve the
balance between nodes’ expertise and responsibilities. Since
in reality a node maintains its local social network, it is
reasonable to assume every node is aware of the expertise
of its neighbors. In this section, we propose a socio-aware
referral strategy (SARS) based on this social context. SARS
is distributed, and draws on the Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm [3] [5], which is a standard approach to guide the
configuration of biased random walk such that it uniquely
converges to an arbitrary distribution. For ease of presentation,
in the following we first give a brief technical review of
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, followed by our proposed
referral strategy. Then we analytically study how to configure
the strategy in practice. We also discuss the implications from
a gaming-strategy point of view.
A. Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
A random walk on graph G starts at a node v0, and π0 is an
arbitrary initial distribution. If the random walk is at node ut at
time Step t, it moves to its randomly selected neighboring node
ut+1 at Step t + 1 with a certain probability distribution. Let
πt be the distribution of node ut such that πt(v) = p(ut = v),
for each v ∈ V . The transition matrix of the random walk
is denoted by P , of which an entry Puv , u, v ∈ V , is the
probability that the random walk moves from Node u to its
neighbor v in one step. Thus, πt+1 = πt · P .
Theorem 1 [5]. Let π be a desired probability distribution.
For each neighbor v of Node u, let
Puv =
{
1
du
if π(u)du ≤
π(v)
dv
,
1
dv
· π(v)π(u) if π(u)du >
π(v)
dv
,
and Puu = 1−
∑
v∈Nu Puv . Then π is a converged probability
distribution of a random walk with the transition matrix P .
Assuming that π is the desired distribution, and πt is the
probability distribution of node visitation by the random walk
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at Step t, the extent to which the convergence is achieved at
Step t is measured by,
||π − πt|| = 12
∑
v∈V
πt(v)− π(v),
where the factor 12 is used to ensure that ||π − πt|| never
exceeds 1. Obviously, ||π − πt|| = 0 represents complete
convergence. The convergence time, defined as
τ() = min{t : ∀t′ ≥ t, ||π − π′t|| ≤ },
measures the time πt takes to converge to π. Fast convergence
means that ||π − πt|| decreases quickly as t grows. The
convergence time of a random walk is bounded as follows:
Theorem 2 [6]. Let πmin = minπi>0πi. Then, τ() ≤
1
1−λ2 log((πmin)
−1), λ2 is the second largest eigenvalue of
the transition matrix P .
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm provides a convergence-
guaranteed mechanism to configure the biased random walk.
In the next section, we will show that our proposed referral
strategy leverages the core of this algorithm, and additionally
introduces the forwarding probability q (see Definition 1).
B. Socio-aware referral strategy
Intuitively, more knowledgable nodes could contribute more
to OSS. We seek to develop a referral strategy, such that
when the systems reaches the steady state, we can achieve
the principle – the higher the capability, the higher the re-
sponsibility. Different from the study in [7] which relies on a
centralized expertise finder, we study the distributed referral
strategy which only requires the information of a node’s local
social network.
If a node u that receives Question i has expertise in i, it
responds to the node that poses i with an answer. Since the
system allows a questioner to receive multiple answers, inde-
pendently, u decides whether to forward i to a next hop node
according to the forwarding probability q and, if so, forward
i to a randomly selected neighbor according to Theorem 1. If
not, the current referral session ends. Each referral session is
also initiated with a hop-limit, and considered finished if this
hop limit is exceeded.
Lemma 1 When the system reaches the steady state, the
probability of Node v ∈ V being visited by all posed questions
in the system is π(v).
By “reaches steady state”, we mean the random walk con-
verges. Lemma 1 directly follows Theorem 1, which ensures
that each node is visited with the desired probability after the
convergence. We also note that since the node receiving a
question forwards it to a next hop node with a probability
q, the transition matrix P ∗ = q · P . Fig. 1 illustrates the
transition probabilities between two neighboring nodes in our
system. We assume π(u)du ≤
π(v)
dv
, thus P ∗uv =
q
du
, and
P ∗vu =
q
du
· π(u)π(v) . We can verify the flow balance condition that
π(u)P ∗uv = π(v)P
∗
vu in this situation. Considering our purpose
is to study the balance between nodes’ expertise capacities and
responsibilities, following Lemma 1 we draw the following
conclusion.
u v
u
q
d
? ?
? ?u
uq
d v
?
?
?
Fig. 1. Example of transition between u and v ( π(u)
du
≤ π(v)
dv
).
Proposition 1 When the system reaches the steady state,
the responsibility that Node v ∈ V undertakes in the system
is proportional to π(v).
It is easy to see that the above proposition holds independent
of the imbalance among nodes in terms of the number of
questions they pose.
In practice, any distributed referral strategy would incur
communication overhead. Due to space limitations, we do not
present the analysis of the communication cost of SARS, and
leave the detailed study as future work.
C. Analysis
To achieve the balance between nodes’ capabilities and
responsibilities, we can compare the workload taken by a node
and the benefit it gains by registering its expertise. Let the
cost of receiving/handling a question be α, and the benefit
of obtaining an answer be β. We further denote by C the
number of forwardings caused by all posed questions in the
system during the time period of interest, and cu, the number
of questions posed by Node u2. Thus the net benefit Node u
obtains is
Ou = β ·
cu∑
i=1
Aui − αC · π(u), (2)
where A is given in Eqn. (1). By adjusting the probability
distribution π(u), the system can achieve the desired balance.
In the following analysis, we set
π(u) =
F(wu)∑
v∈V F(wv)
, (3)
where F is an arbitrary increasing function, such as
F(x) = x or F(x) = x2.
Obviously, the user registered expertise w, is the only in-
formation required for the system to achieve the desired
performance. Thus for a node in the system, its benefit of
registering expertise, which could be embodied by obtaining
answers when it poses questions, is balanced by the cost of
undertaking the responsibility of answering questions.
1) Effect of F : The system can configure the function F
to adjust the balance of each user.
Consider two users u and v with expertise wu and wv ,
respectively. We assume u is more knowledgable than v, and
2We consider the cu questions posed by Node u are different questions.
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let wu = ρ · wv , where ρ > 1. We study the implication of
configuring F(x). Let F(x) = xm, m > 0. We can compare
the responsibilities the two users undertake. By Definition 2
and Eqn. (3), we obtain
ru
rv
=
Cπ(u)
Cπ(v)
= ρm.
Note that ρ times difference in the capacities of two users leads
to a ρm times difference in the responsibilities undertaken by
them. This implies that a function F(x) with a fast increasing
speed (e.g. a function with a large m here) can have a
considerable proportion of questions directed to users with
higher expertise. This enables the system to control the flow
of posed questions by configuring the function F(x).
2) Game among users: By setting π and F , the system can
achieve the desired balance. However, the goal of a practical
OSS system is to benefit its users as well as the system as a
whole. As a user, the benefit is to obtain satisfactory service by
participating; as the system operator, the benefit is to maintain
and draw as many active users as possible so as to maximize
the revenue. Ensuring all users receive satisfactory service in
a balanced manner is an important consideration. However,
in order to achieve balance, inappropriate configuration of
the system may bring losses to the service provider. In the
following, we analyze the system from a gaming-strategy point
of view, and discuss the implication to applications.
In the above analysis, we assume each user honestly reg-
isters his expertise. However, in reality, an all-round expert
is likely to be unwilling to register all he knows [8], and
publishes an underestimated expertise in the system. We can
model this scenario as a strategic game and assume that a
user’s objective is to maximize its net benefit in Eqn. (2),
which is considered as a node’s payoff function. The action
of a user is to register its expertise by w. Denote by w∗ the
real capacity of a user’s expertise, we have 0 < w ≤ w∗.
For clarity, we substantiate the forwarding probability q with
a simple form qu = ρ · wu, ρ > 0 (by Definition 1), and
configure F(x) = x. Combining Eqns. (1), (2), and (3), we can
obtain the Nash equilibrium/equilibria by solving the following
system of equations
∂Ou
∂wu
= ϕuρ
1 + (T − 2)(ρwu)T−1 − (T − 1)(ρwu)T−2
(1− ρwu)2
−αC
∑
v∈V\u wv∑
v∈V wv
= 0
for all u ∈ V , where ϕu = β ·
∑cu
i=1 eui .
We consider a simple scenario of only two users (i.e., |V| =
2). Thus the payoff functions are calculated by
O1(w1, w2) =
ϕ1
1− ρw1 −
αCw1
w1 + w2
, (4)
O2(w1, w2) =
ϕ2
1− ρw2 −
αCw2
w1 + w2
. (5)
Without loss of generality, we further simplify the scenario by
classifying a node’s behavior into only two actions, registering
an underestimated expertise capacity w′ < w∗ and registering
its real capacity w∗. Then one can analyze the system based
on the above game. Since our purpose here is to contend that
appropriate settings of π and F are important for the system in
addition to achieving a desired balance, we do not investigate
the game in detail. Instead, two examples are used in the
following to show the implications to the OSS applications.
9
8
98
w2
w1
u2
(0, 0)
(4.71, 0.29)
(0.29, 4.71)
(5, 5)
u1
(a) Example 1
3
2
98
w2
w1
(-0.75, -3)
(-1.30, -2.73)
(-0.57, 1.82)
(-1.07, 7.5)
u1
u2
(b) Example 2
Fig. 2. Gaming examples
In the first example, we assume the action set for both
players is {8, 9}. Fig. 2(a) depicts their payoffs according to
(4) and (5), where ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 1, ρ = 0.1, and αC = 10.
We can see the action profile (9, 9) constitutes the unique
Nash equilibrium, which is also optimal for both players.
This is desired for the system since each user will actively
participating by registering its real expertise while receiving
satisfactory service. Applying the same setting, Fig. 2(b)
depicts another example, in which the action set for User 1 is
{2, 3} and that for User 2 is {8, 9}. The action profile (2, 9)
constitutes the Nash equilibrium, in which User 1 unfairly
maximizes the payoff by not contributing all of its expertise
while User 2 receives non-optimal payoff by contributing all
its effort. Thus User 1 may get a “free ride” and User 2 is
frustrated and leaves the system. This brings loss to the system.
Note that the aforementioned balance holds in both examples.
Therefore, the implication is that with the desired balance,
inappropriate configuration of the referral strategy may lead
to ramifications to the OSS applications.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we study empirically the performance of
our proposed referral strategy. In particular, we investigate the
following performance metric.
Balance Index during a time period of interest in an OSS
system is defined as
BI =
∑
u∈V
∣∣∣πu − ru
C
∣∣∣,
where C records the total number of forwardings caused by
all posed questions in the system during the time period of
interest, πu is set by Eqn. (3), and ru is give by Definition 2.
We study the convergence rate of BI when C increases under
various settings.
We utilize the connectivity data of a set of OSNs, namely
Orkut, LiveJournal, collected by Mislove et al. [9]. Orkut
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OSN Orkut LiveJournal
Number of nodes 3,072,441 5,284,457
Estimated crawled fraction 11.3% 95.4%
Number of links 223,534,301 77,402,652
Av. no. of friends per node 106.1 16.97
Fraction of symmetric links 100.0% 73.5%
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF THE OSN DATASETS [9]
is a website of explicitly defined social network to help
people meet new friends and maintain existing relationships.
LiveJournal is an online social network of bloggers. The major
statistics of these datasets are summarized in Table I. We
believe it is more realistic to evaluate the system on these
real social network data3. Since the networks are too big for
evaluation, we sample several different portions from each
network with Snowball sampling [10]. We set the size of the
sampled networks to 1 × 104. We also set T = 25, and the
forwarding probability in a referral session q = 0.9 + 0.1w,
where the expertise w of each node is randomly selected in
the range of [1, 10]. During the simulation, the nodes posing
questions are randomly selected from the population.
We first study the effectiveness of our proposed SARS.
Here, we set F(x) = x, and compare the performances
achieved by SARS and the simple random walk (SRW)
referral strategy. SRW is popularly studied and utilized in the
literature [11] [12]. In SRW, if a node decides to forward
a question, it simply forwards the question to a uniformly
selected neighboring node. Fig. 3(a) shows the simulation
result. We can clearly observe that for both social network
datasets, SARS outperforms SRW (i.e. the BI achieved by
SARS converges much faster than that achieved by SRW).
We note that when C is smaller than 1 × 104, the BI of
SARS is slightly larger than that of SRW. This is because
the system does not reach the steady state (note that the
size of the network is set to 1 × 104). We also observe that
no clear distinction exists in the resulting performances from
Orkut and LiveJournal while the two datasets have different
connectivities. By investigating the sampled networks, we find
that both networks have a large average degree. This leads us
to an empirical conclusion: the system performance in terms
of the balance index is independent of its underlying network
connectivity when the system has a large number of users.
We further study the convergence of the balance index with
different configurations of the function F(x) = xm,m > 0.
From Fig. 3(b) we can see that the balance index converges
under different values of m when the system reaches steady
state. In addition, it converges slower under a larger value
of m, which matches our analysis (in Section III-C1) that a
fast increasing F(x) enlarges the distinction in responsibilities
taken by nodes with different expertise.
3Utilizing datasets from actual OSS applications such as Aardvark (which
is based on Facebook) would be ideal, but those datasets are unavailable since
Facebook prohibits automated crawlers.
(a) Different strategy (b) Different F (LiveJournal)
Fig. 3. Performance evaluation result.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the balancing between the users’
capabilities and responsibilities of OSS. We propose an analyt-
ical model that captures the heterogeneity of different referral
sessions. With the design principle – the higher the capability,
the higher the responsibility, we proposed a distributed socio-
aware referral strategy that is proved able to achieve the
desired balance when the system reaches steady state. We
analyze in detail the strategy’s configuration functions that
enable the system operator to control the flow of all posed
questions in the system. The evaluation based on crawled
data of several OSNs validates our analysis. We also discuss
the implications of configuring the referral strategy from a
gaming-strategy point of view, and show that, with the desired
balance, inappropriate configuration of the referral strategy
may lead to ramifications to the OSS applications. In the
future, we would like to further investigate this interesting
issue in detail.
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